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Abstract
Thispapertriestobridgepartofthegapbetweenthetheoreticalmodelofmixedaltruismandtheempiricalresearch
on charitable behaviour. We use questionnaire data on charitable donations from a representative sample of the
Flemish population. We link interindividual differences in behaviour to the answers on direct motivational
questions. The results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Respondents who are more sensitive to warm
glow considerations donate more. A stronger preference for the public good does not lead to a higher level of
private giving. This can be seen as weak evidence for the crowding out-effect. Tax prices have no significant
effect. This has mainly to do with lack of information and limited tax awareness.
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1 Introduction
While economists have usually been reluctant to discuss the effects of preference differences,
a large part of the recent theoretical literature on altruism and private donations has focused on
the structure of individual utility functions. There is a simple reason for that unusual research
interest. The traditional model, in which private donations are taken to be contributions for the
voluntary provision of a pure public good, leads to extreme behavioural predictions. In that
model there will be "one for one"-crowding out, as an optimizing individual will perfectly
substitute his own donations for donations from another source. Government intervention is
"neutral", because increases in government expenditures lead to equal decreases in individual
contributions. Things change, however, when one takes into account that persons are not uni-
quelymotivated by the outcome or result of their contribution. Models of "mixed" or "impure"
altruism incorporate the idea that the valuation of the act of giving itself may be as important
as the outcome of that act (i.e. the valuation of the public good for which the donation is a
contribution). Inthesemodels,thestrongpredictionofone-for-onecrowdingoutdoesnolonger
hold.
In principle the choice between the two approaches could be decided on empirical grounds.
There is indeed some direct evidence to reject the strong crowding-out hypothesis. Private
giving is not insignificant in most western societies, even in fields where public provision is
huge, and government intervention apparently has not resulted in the complete crowding out of
private initiatives. Empirical studies only find (slight) evidence of some partial crowding out.
Except for Kingma (1989), however, these studies make use of aggregated data, and do not
focus on the issue of preference variation. Most of the applied literature with individual data
concentrates on issues which are not immediately relevant to the theoretical debate. Empirical2
work is largely based on amodel which considers donations as any ordinary consumptiongood
and focuses on price- and income effects. Preference variation is introduced in a rather ad
hoc-way
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With this paper we want to make a contribution to bridging the gap between the theoretical and
the empirical work on charitable donations. Data at the individual level are needed if we want
to get a better insight into the structure of preferences. We therefore collected such data from
a representative sample of the Flemish population (1990). We asked for detailed information
on donations and socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, we included in the questionnaire
32 items measuring the motivation (not) to donate. This information enables us to test whether
thispreference-relatedinformationcanmakeasignificantcontributioninaneconometricmodel
of charitable behaviour.
In section 2 we give an overview of some theoretical topics, which are relevant for the choice
ofmodel specificationand fortheinterpretation of theempirical results. The questionnaireand
the sample are presented in section 3.1 and the direct information on preferences is described
and analysed in section 3.2. Section 4 comments on the empirical explanation of charitable
behaviour in our sample. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preference variation and donations: some theoretical notes
The literature contains different approaches to model donation behaviour. We adopt themodel
of"conditionaldonations"basedonthetheoryofrationing(seealsoSchiff,1985). Anindividual
i allocates his exogenously given net income between his level of donations and private
consumption . Since donations may create externalities, his utility will also depend on the
mi gi
xi
1 Clotfelter (1985) contains a complete overview of the literature on price- and income elasticities of charitable
donations until 1985. Two papers focusing on preferences are Long (1976) and Amos (1982). Long (1976)
concludesthat"personalforms"ofsolicitation(friendsand workplacerelationships)increasecontributions. Amos
(1982)concludesthat"indirect"motives(thedesireforpublicgoods)or"Kantian"(act-)motivesaremoreimportant
than direct benefit (political, religious, income or social pressure) motives.3
levelofcontributionsbyothersandbygovernment. Weassumethatprivatedonationsbyothers
andgovernment contributions areperfectly substitutable
2 andwrite their sumas . Ofcourse,
individual i cannot decide upon the level of . When modelling this as a rationing constraint,
we set the exogenously given level of other’s donations equal to . The price of private
consumptionis normalized to one, theprice of private donations is . This is the marginal cost
intermsofconsumptionforegone. Itisinfluencedbythesystemoftaxdeductibilityofdonations,




Note carefully that this is a model of individual behaviour and that the utility function may be
different for different individuals. However, for notational convenience we will drop the sub-
scriptiuntilsection 2.2. In generalthesolutionofthisoptimisationproblem willbeadonations
function . Under the standard conditions of consumer theory we can assume that
and .
Moreinteresting, however, isthe effect of changes in . Following thetheory of rationing,we
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2 Assuming imperfect substitutability between donations of other individuals and government contributions, as in
Schiff (1985), or imperfect substitutability between all possible sources of other’s donations, as in Van Ootegem
(1995), does not add any fundamental insights for the points we wish to make.
3 This assumption is not as innocuous as it may seem at first, because the government could charge a positive tax
price for additional contributions. However, for our purposes this is not a crucial point.4
This virtual price, , is the marginal willingness to pay for other’s giving and it measures the
moneyvaluation of anadditional unit of provided at zerocost. At this virtual price, thelevel
of other’s contributions just equals thelevel the individual would have demanded in the case of
unconditional behaviour. The partial effect (for a given level of income) of a change in other’s
contributionsupon individualvoluntary donations, beingthe(Nash) reactionfunction,canthen
be written as
Eq. (3) shows that the effect of a change in other’s contributions can be subdivided in a com-
pensated effect ( ) and an income effect, with the marginal propensity to donate
and thechangeinrealincomeinducedbyachangeinother’sgiving. Notethatthe(marginal)
income effect as well as the substitution effect are evaluated at virtual prices and income.
We can simplify the interpretation of considerably if we are willing to assume that private
consumption is independent in the utility function from the donations of other individuals.
Indeed, under this assumption
Let us now start from (3) and (4) to model preference variation. We first concentrate on the
two extreme cases from the literature (section 2.1) and then look for a formalization of inter-
mediate situations (section 2.2).
2.1 Public goods and warm glow
Ifwewanttomodelpreferencedifferences,itisnecessarytostructuremoreexplicitlythegeneral


































where and . This approach has been called "mixed" or "impure" altruism in
theliterature(CornesandSandler,1984,1994,Andreoni,1989,1990). Theutilityfunctionnow
reflectstwo possible motivations to donate. The first motivation is concern for the public good
G, which is produced by the sum total of all the contributions. The second motivation is the
psychological satisfaction derived from giving by the giver himself. Andreoni (1989, 1990)
talks about a "warm glow"- but the effect may also capture less positive feelings like the need
to yield to social pressure by one’s neighbours.
This approach leads immediately to two extreme cases. The first has been called in a rather
unfortunateterminologypurealtruism. Itassumesthattheonlymotivationtogiveistheconcern
for the public good, i.e. and therefore . The individual does not value his own
contributionanymorethancontributionsfromothers. Other’sgivingandowngivingareperfect
substitutes. In the optimum it will then be true that . Moreover, and more importantly,
eq. (3) reduces to
A sufficient condition for a negatively sloped Nash reaction curve is that . If private
consumptionisanormal good,theincomeeffect canneverbesufficient to compensatethe(one
for one) substitution effect. A higher contribution of the rest of the community will crowd out
an individual’s private donation.
Among others, Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986) have shown that the (positive) income
effect completely vanishes when the increase in follows from additional government con-
tributions which must be financed by lump sum taxes on contributors and when those taxes do
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as to maintain the same level of private consumption. This result isgenerally described as "one
for one"-crowding out of private giving w.r.t. increased public contributions or the neutrality
of total public good provision w.r.t. government contributions or income redistribution. In this
model the only way that the government can have any (significant) impact on the provision of
public goods is to completely crowd out private provision.
The second extreme case has been baptized "pure egoism" by Andreoni (1989, 1990). Here it
isassumedthatindividualsdo not careforthepublic good andonlydonatebecauseof thewarm
glow-effect. This implies that and therefore . Eq. (5) reduces to
There is then no crowding out of private donations by giving from others.
2.2 A formal model of preference variation?
Until now we worked with the abstract utility function , where we
reintroduced the individual subscript. The extreme cases of pure altruism and pure egoism are
interestingasa theoreticalbenchmarkbut in actualreality mostdonorswill probably be"mixed
altruists" and the weight given in the utility function to the different motivations will vary over
individuals. We can model such preference variation by introducing a vector of psychological
characteristics to get . However, we do not know very wellhow
to model the effect of changes in .
Andreoni (1989, 1990) indexes what he calls "the degree of altruism" of the economic agents
by a coefficient , which, adapted to our notation, is defined as
U
g- = p














This definition works perfectly well for the extreme cases. For the pure altruists (and under
Andreoni’s assumption that ), ; for the pure egoists . This "ex post"
definition is based on the equation for optimal giving itself and it proves to be useful in the
theoretical analysis of the crowding-out phenomenon. It is less suited for empirical work,
however. It is impossible to use Andreoni’s ex post concept as an explanatory variable in the
equation for optimal giving. We still have to parameterize explicitly differences in and
(more importantly) .
Asomewhatmorepromising approachisfollowedby CornesandSandler(1994). Theyspecify
the utility function as
Cornes and Sandler (1994) interpret the parameters and mainly as "technological" factors,
reflecting for instance the production technology of the public good and the marketing efforts
of charitable organisations. But for our purposes we can also make them individual-specific,
interpret andparameterizevariationsinthepsychologicalcharacteristicsasvariations
in and . Note that the extreme cases of pure altruism and pure egoism are captured by
and respectively. ThecomparativestaticresultsinCornesandSandler
(1994)thenyieldinterestinginsightsin termsofcomplementarity/substitutabilityrelationships.
The direction of the effects can only be determined under restrictive assumptions, however.
Moreover, eq. (9) is already restrictive as such, in the sense that both and enter multipli-
catively,i.e. asa proportionalshift parameter. Itis wellknownthat this makes changesin these
parameterssimilartopricechangesandthatotherspecificationsyieldquitedifferentbehavioural
predictions (see, e.g., Schokkaert, 1982). There is no a priori reason why the multiplicative
specification would be preferable over these alternatives for empirical work.
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Given the present state of our knowledge, we found it advisable to take an agnostic stance and
to follow a reduced-form approach in our empirical specification. We will therefore introduce
variations in directly into the equations for optimal donations. However, we will use direct
information on motivations to link our empirical results to the altruism-egoism dimension, or
better, to the public good and the warm glow preference structures.
3 Altruism or Egoism in Flanders: a questionnaire
4
In May 1991, an oral and representative survey (n=1013, age 18 and more) was conducted in
Flanders, the Dutch speaking community of Belgium. The general aim was to collect data (for
the year 1990) about the importance of individual charity, the market shares of different
organisations, the motives underlying the act of (not) giving and the use of the funds collected.
We will discuss the motivational questions in more detail in section 3.2. In section 3.1 we first
give a short overview of the general results on the amount of giving.
3.1 The amount of private gift-giving
Amongst the Flemish population, 16% has not given anything to any charitable organisation
during the year 1990, 84% reports to have made a non-deductible donation and 16% also made
a tax-deductible donation. The average deductible donation is 5051 BEF, the average
non-deductible donation is 801 BEF. Based on these statistics, we can estimate total charitable
giving in Flanders in 1990 to be about 4.5 to 5 billion BEF. This represents 0.21% of total
pi
4 More information about, and aggregate results of, the survey can be found in Van Ootegem (1995).9
private consumption in the same year. All these figures are based on the answers of the
respondents. However, as far as we can compare our data with official statistics, e.g. on
deductible gifts, they seem quite reliable (Van Ootegem, 1995)
5.
We have also asked about the distribution of the donations over various causes. The results are
summarized in table 1. We see that the largest share of voluntary giving goes to organisations
involved in development projects, followed by projects for the sick and disabled.
Table 1 about here
For a donation to be deductible from taxable income, under Belgian tax law, a base amount of
1000 BEF for each organisation is minimally required. 91% of the respondents knows that
minimum requirement, but only 30% is able to estimate the amount one recovers due to the
system of deductibility. We will return to this lack of knowledge when we discuss the results
in section 4.2.
3.2 Some direct evidence on motivations
An important aim of our survey was to derive some direct information on the motivations of
the respondents. We therefore included 32 questions related to the motivation to donate or not
todonate (seetable 2). Eachitem includedfour answeringpossibilities,ranging fromcomplete
agreement to total disagreement. We are well aware that our range of items cannot possibly
captureallmotivestogive. Ontheotherhand,itisalreadytooextensivetobepracticallyuseful.
We therefore reduced the number of variables through a factor analysis. This means that we
5OurestimateddonationsareverylowwhencomparedtoU.S.A.figures. Yetthetwosituationsarenotcomparable.
Governmentintervention(andhence taxation)ismuchlarger inEurope. Morethanhalfofthegivingin theU.S.A.
is directed towards religious organisations. Moreover, organisations in the U.S.A. use more professional
fund-raising techniques and are united in several important pressure groups.10
constructed a small set of underlying, hypothetical variables or factors, so that the observed
variablesarelinearcombinationsoftheunderlyingfactors. Thesefactorsindicatethedimensions
along which we can structure the utility functions.
Table 2 about here
Table 2givesthematrixoffactorloadingsafteravarimaxrotation
6. 27.3%ofthetotalvariance
in the 32 items is explained by six common factors. Interpretation of such factors is always
subjective to a certain extent but the overall pattern seems clear.
Mostof theitemsloading onfactor onearerelatedto apersonal principleor code. There isalso
ahigh correlationwithfeelingsofguiltandreligious conviction(taken upby thesecond factor).
None of the items contains any reference to other people or to the use of the funds collected by
means of charity. They all refer to the private sphere and motivations of the individual. This
is also the case for the items of factor two, that refer to some kind of social or psychological
pressure (not to refuse) to donate. Still, there is no reference to the use of the funds. A person
attaching high importance to factor two seems to care strongly about what others think about
him.
Most items of factor three on the contrary point to some specific use of the gift. The contrast
with factor six suggests that factor three does not mainly represent a feeling of distrust w.r.t.
charitableactions. We rather feel that it points to some interest in theuse made of the collected
means, albeit possibly in a rather narrow-minded sense. The interpretation of factor four may
be twofold. Most items refer to qualities of the fund-raising organisations (information and
6 The factor analysis was conducted using the SAS-package. As initial estimates of the communalities, we used
the squared multiple correlations (SMC). Additonal factors are extracted until the eigenvalues became smaller
than one. We opted for the varimax rotation procedure because it maximizes the variance of the squared loadings
for each factor, and therefore facilitates the interpretation of the columns.11
good use of the funds). The link with the items loading mainly on factor six is obvious. But at
the same time, factor four also indicates a lively and real interest in the good cause. One wants
to have full knowledge of the circumstances and causes of the problems which must be solved
in a structural manner. Agreement with these items points to individuals who are motivated by
the result or outcome of their charitable actions.
Factorfivereflectsmainly financialconstraints. Alltheitemsoffactorsixarerelatedtoaspects
ofthe organisationscollecting thedonations. The main difference with the itemsof factor four,
however, is the fact that the items of factor six do not refer to the final use of the funds, but
remainrestrictedto thecharacteristicsof theorganisations. Factorfourrelates totheevaluation
of organisations as vehicles to transfer money to the good cause, while factor six relates to the
evaluation of organisations as such.
Thelinkbetweenthesemotivationalfactorsandthetheoreticalframeworkintheprevioussection
is not altogether obvious. However, it seems possible to link factors one and two to a kind of
warm-gloweffect. Theydo notrefertotheuseofthefundsbut totheeffectoftheowndonation
on the donor’s utility. We will call them "egoism-principles" and "egoism-pressure" respect-
ively. Factorsthreeandfourdorefertotheuseofthegiftandarethereforemoreoutcome-related.
Theyseemtogivesomeinformationonthepublicgood-component. Toemphasizethedifference
in focus between the two factors we call them "regionaltruism" and "mundialtruism" respect-
ively. We keep to the altruism-egoism terminology because it has become almost generally
accepted in the literature, but it is obviously somewhat confusing from a psychological (or
philosophical) point of view.
After having defined the content of our factors, the next step is to determine the position of the
individuals on these factors, i.e. the interindividual variation in psychological weights. Rather
thanworkingwiththestandardizedfactorscores,wepreferredamoredirectandunstandardised
measure, which gives a better indication of the average weight given to the different factors by12
the overall Flemish population. The weight attached by an individual to a factor is then
determined by making an average of the answers of that individual on all the items loading on
that factor, with a value of four for "very important", three for "important", two for "not
important"andonefor"notatallimportant". The averageimportanceofthefourpsychological
characteristicsissummarizedintable 3. Onaverageourrespondentsagreemorewiththe"public
good" (altruism)-items than with the "warm glow" (egoism)-items
7.
Table 3 about here
In the following section we will investigate the contribution of these psychological structures
fortheexplanationofindividualdonations. Letusfirsttrytoformulatesomeapriorihypotheses,
which can be derived from the theoretical framework in section 2. It is clear that we expect in
generalthatpersonswhoaremoresensitivetowarm-glowconsiderationswillindeedgivemore.
But what about the altruism-motivation? In a world without government we could expect that
respondentswhoaremoreinterestedinthepublic goodwould contributemore,eventaking into
account the free-rider effect. But in a situation with huge government intervention (as is the
case in Belgium) a large part (or even the whole of) these contributions will be crowded out by
the taxes used to finance that government intervention. Therefore we can formulate as an
hypothesis that interindividual differencesin thealtruism- or (public good)motivations will not
lead to differences in individual donations (but most probably will be correlated with the psy-
chological acceptance of high rates of taxation).
7VanOotegem(1995)givessomeresultsontheexplanationofthepsychologicalfactorsintermsofsocioeconomic
characteristics.13
4 Explaining private donations in Flanders
Toexplain the levelof private donations, we estimate aseparate equation for deductible (DED)
and non-deductible donations (NDED). In a certain sense we hypothesise that the two are
different goods. A priori one could expect that deductible giving is a more rational decision,
taken after some deliberation, while the largest part of non-deductible giving is a spontaneous
act. The results for deductible and non-deductible donations are summarised in tables 4 and 5
respectively. Total deductible and non-deductible donations are explained as a function of
disposable income (
8), the respective prices, socio-economic variables, and the psycho-
logical characteristics defined before. The price of non-deductible donations is one. The
individual price of deductible giving ( ) is computed for each respondent on the basis of
the fiscally relevant information (partner, children, profession, net monthly income) provided
by the questionnaire.
Tables 4 and 5 about here
Tohandletheproblemofzeroobservations,wehaveestimatedasimpleTobit-model
9. Wealso
analysed explicitly the problem of price endogeneity (see Reece and Zieschang, 1985), which
may arise from the nonlinearity of the income tax scheme. We computed for all households
reportingapositiveamount ofdeductiblegiving both the"firstfranc"andthe"last franc"-price:
INC
PRICE
8 INC is net household income in BEF for the year 1990.
9 Jones and Posnett (1991a, 1991b) and Smith et al. (1995) reject this simple Tobit-specification in favour of a
moregeneraltwo-stagemodel,wheretheeffectofthevariousexplanatoryvariablesmaybedifferentintheselection
equation(givingornotgiving)andinthelevelequation(whatamounttogive). However,theresultsofthetwo-stage
estimation are rather sensitiveto the choice of variables included in both stages, about which we do not have good
a priori hypotheses. We therefore preferred to stick to the simple Tobit-specification.14
in our sample none of the donating households moved through its donation into another tax
bracket. We therefore neglect the problem of price endogeneity and we used the "first franc"-
price as explanatory variable.
We will now first interpret the price and income effects and then turn to the psychological
variables.
4.1 The effect of tax deductibility
Table 4 shows the estimation results for the model of individual deductible donations. In all
the variants of the model, the Tobit coefficient for income is .004-.005. Correcting for the fact
that only about 15% of the sample has non-zero deductible donations, this leads to a marginal
income share of .00060-.00075. Using the information from the survey that the average
deductible donations for all the Flemish households are about .07% of disposable income
10,w e
canthenestimatetheincomeelasticityof deductibledonationsin Flandersto beabout.86-1.07.
The income effect on non-deductible donations is hardly significant. Perhaps this confirms our
ideathat non-deductible giving is rather a spontaneousact, an immediateanswer to some direct
request.
Contrary to the results in most of the existing (U.S.A.-based) empirical literature, the price of
deductible donations has no significant impact on the amount of deductible giving
11. Multi-
collinearity is not a sufficient explanation for this result. Indeed, when we substitute for INC
thepersonalperceptionofthefinancialsituation(INCPER
12),whichweexpecttobelessdirectly
correlated with the prices, the price effect does get the expected sign but remains insignificant
(column 2). And the same is true when we omit the income variable altogether (column 3).
10 The average deductible donation of the whole sample is 748 BEF. Average disposable income in our survey
is 959 078 BEF.
11 The same is true in Jones and Posnett (1991a, 1991b).
12 With INCPER=1: "very bad", INCPER=2: "bad", INCPER=3: "good" and INCPER=4: "very good".15
Theremaybeanalternativeexplanation:thetaxawarenessofthepopulationapparentlyismuch
weaker in Flanders (in Europe?) than in the U.S.A. We mentioned already that only 30% of
our respondents is able to give an estimate of their own individual tax price. Since we had
sufficient information to calculate for all individuals their actual tax price, we could check the
accuracyof these estimatesby the respondents. The Pearson correlationbetween thecomputed
taxpricesandtheanswersbytherespondentsis-0.04. Table 6givesanideaabouttheestimation
errorsmadebyourrespondents: only21.5%(ofthe30%whohavegivenanestimate)iscapable
to estimate the price of a deductible donation within a margin of error of plus/minus 0.05. We
can safely conclude that our respondents have no idea about the exact price of deductible
donations. It is therefore not surprising that it plays only a minor role in their decisions on
charitable giving. Because of the insignificance of the price-influence and the correlation with
the traditional income variable, we decided to discard the price variable.
Table 6 about here
4.2 Altruism, egoism and crowding out: a tentative interpretation of the effects
of preference variation
If we capture preference variation through the traditional socioeconomic variables we get the
resultsincolumn(4)oftable 4andcolumn(2)oftable 5. Schooling
13andagehaveasignificantly
positive effect on deductible donations, as is commonly found in the literature. The effect of
ageonnon-deductibledonationsisnotsignificant,however. AninterestingvariableisIMPREL:
this is a level variable capturing the importance of religion for the respondents
14. A stronger
13SCHOOL1:primaryeducation,SCHOOL2:lowertechnicallevel,SCHOOL3:lowergenerallevel,SCHOOL4:
highertechnical level, SCHOOL5:higher general level, SCHOOL6:non-university higher education,SCHOOL7:
university level.
14 With IMPREL1: "very important", IMPREL2: "important", IMPREL3: "not important" and IMPREL4: "not at
all important".16
religious inspiration leads to larger donations. This effect is stronger for non-deductible
donations, which could have to do with the fact that many of the smaller (non-deductible)





explanatory power to the equations. Columns (5) in table 4 and (3) in table 5 show that from a
statisticalpoint ofviewtheydo. Or,better,two of themotivational constructs playasignificant
role:the"egoism-socialpressure"-factorand(moreimportantly)the"egoism-principles"factor,
bothrelatedto thewarmglow. Whatweinterpreted as"altruism" (orpublicgood-)motivations
have no significant influence on the level of donations. These results are perfectly in line with
the hypotheses formulated at the end of section 3. Note that there is some interplay between
thecoefficientsofthe"warmglow"-variablesandtheimportanceattachedtoreligion. This was
to be expected.
By and large, our empirical results confirm the models in the theoretical literature. We cannot
reject the traditional hypothesis of free rider behaviour and crowding out in the case of public
good-motivations. Inourdataset,anincreaseinthe(stated)willingnesstoprovidecontributions
for the public good has no significant impact on concrete charitable donations. But the pure
public good model is not complete, because it has difficulties to explainthe existenceof private
donations even in a situation with huge government intervention. Our results suggest that this
phenomenon can partly be explained by warm glow-motivations. It seems useful to structure
the utility functions of potential donors along the lines suggested by economic theory. Models
of mixed altruism are a promising starting point to model charitable behaviour.
15 We also tried a number of regional dummies: they are not significant.17
5 Conclusion
Empirical reality requires an approach that takes into account variation in preferences. The
theoreticalmodel of mixed orimpure altruism offersaninterestingstarting point. It hasseldom
been used to guide empirical work, however. Most empirical work has concentrated on the
effect of tax deductibility (the price effect) and on the influence of income and other
socio-economic characteristics.
We aimed at bridging part of that gap between theoretical and empirical work by setting up a
questionnaire which made it possible to link the amount of charitable giving to differences in
motivations. We used factor analysis to classify the answers to such motivational questions in
some basic factors, which could be meaningfully related to the "public good" and the "warm
glow"motivations that appearin thetheoreticalliterature. Wethen introduced thisinformation
in an explanatory model of charitable behaviour. The price of charitable donations is not
important to explain deductible giving. Our survey reveals that this may have to do with lack
of information and limited tax awareness. Deductible donations are positively correlated with
the net household income, the age and the level of schooling of the respondent. The income
effect on non-deductible donations is hardly significant.
In general, respondents who are more sensitive to warm glow considerations donate more.
However, a stronger preference for the public good does not lead to a higher level of private
giving. These findings are perfectly consistent with the theoretical predictions. Under the
hypothesis of crowding out we could expect that differences in the degree of altruism ceteris
paribus would not lead to larger private gifts in an environment with huge government inter-
vention.
It is clear that our results have to be interpreted with caution. Yet it is promising that direct
information on motivations, even if measured in a far from perfect way, apparently improves
theexplanatorypower of anequation explaining charitablebehaviour. It is the more promising18
that the direction of the effects is in line with what could be expected on the basis of theory.
Morework is needed to introduce preference variation in a formalmodel of mixed altruism and
to explore in a more rigorous way the consequences of various specifications.19
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Table 1: Allocation of private contributions to public goods.
Cause Deductible Non-Deductible
People in developing countries (TW) 45.84 34.99
The sick and disabled (SD) 21.54 31.34
The poor in Belgium (P) 8.18 7.88
Political prisoners and refugees (R) 7.42 3.39
The environment (E) 2.20 9.55
Immigrants 0.00 0.31
Other cause (explicitly mentioned) 1.66 7.83
No cause mentioned 13.16 4.71
Total 100 10022
Table 2
32 items : Matrix of factor loadings after varimax rotation.
Variance explained: 27.3 7.9 5.0 5.0 4.3 2.7 2.4
(=100) (29.0) (18.3)  (18.2) (15.7) (10.0) (8.7)
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Factor 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
(11) I find it difficult to turn down organisa- .501 .646 .288 -.018 .026 .007 -.004
tions or rallies committing themselves to
the good cause
(24) I consider it my duty to help wherever I .413 .600 .057 .096 .105 -.037 .169
can
(15) I would like to support whenever possible .325 .538 .165 -.010 -.036 .052 .063
all campaigns and organisations committing
themselves to the good cause
(9) I find it hard to turn down children ringing .332 .526 .150 .101 .069 .127 -.034
the door-bell to raise money for the good
cause
(16) I highly respect people having the courage .274 .455 -.111 .108 .133 .128 .098
to raise money for the good cause
(22) If an (urgent) emergency arises, I will .271 .444 -.010 .237 .099 .010 .088
support help
(13) Whoever is financially at ease, has to sup- .201 .376 -.033 .080 .035 .220 .053
port the good cause
(32) The government of Belgium should gen- .178 .317 -.133 .015 .219 .034 .098
erally give more aid to charity organisations
(31) There are certain campaigns or organisa- .151 .267 .146 .087 .074 -.135 .164
tions for which I have a special liking
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Factor 2 1 2 3 4 5 6
(23) I will support sooner when I see that .353 .127 .540 .056 -.111 .161 .061
others support as well
(28) Sometimes I feel obliged to support the .263 .055 .484 .084 -.086 -.030 .102
good cause because of my surroundings
(neighbours, colleagues, etc.)
(27) I feel obliged to support the good cause .371 .311 .452 .110 -.072 -.161 .162
because of my religious conviction
(30) I feel guilty when I do not give .395 .406 .442 -.069 -.001 -.138 .016
(18) I need a long time to decide whether I .181 -.109 .363 .045 .004 .171 -.076
should give money to a particular cause or
not
(26) I tend to give sooner to campaigns or .205 .055 .361 .153 .047 .171 .129
organisations selling things for the good .
cause than to campaigns or organisations
which only raise funds23
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Factor 3 1 2 3 4 5 6
(20) I tend to support a cause more when the .370 .018 .078 .578 .124 .118 .023
money raised is destined to projects in my
own neighbourhood
(21) Rather than giving via charity organisa- .344 .038 .000 .568 .139 .010 -.025
tions, I’d prefer to give it straight to people
who need it
(17) I prefer smaller, local organisations to .301 .114 .093 .525 .060 -.004 .019
larger national organisations
(12) I am more likely to back charity actions or .308 .166 .070 .488 .159 .052 .096
organisations when I know people who
already benefited from their aid
(25) I prefer to give when I know the person .314 .095 .300 .423 .010 .086 .172
who is asking for the gift
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Factor 4 1 2 3 4 5 6
(5) Organisations need to provide feed-back on .351 -.057 -.012 .105 .576 .063 .009
what they accomplished with the money
they raised
(29) I would like to know exactly what hap- .327 .048 .015 .162 .543 .059 .021
pened with the money raised
(8) Organisations have to provide a lot of infor- .262 .106 -.050 .042 .481 -.054 .110
mation on the origin and the extent of the
causes they back
(7) Organisations have to tackle the problems .237 .157 -.111 .044 .415 .008 .160
at their root
(1) Organisations are not to have any political .089 .109 -.020 .069 .248 .019 .101
tendency or colour
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
 Factor 5 1 2 3 4 5 6
(19) I would suffer financially when giving .285 -.005 -.006 .036 .035 .531 .020
away a large amount of money
(10) My generosity depends on the financial .260 .144 .101 .030 .003 .476 .044
burden on me at the moment they call upon
my support (e.g., a costly month)
(14) When I am not asked personally for char- .140 .088 .193 .123 .040 .280 .002
ity, I often forget to give money
 Item Comm Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor
Factor 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
(3) Organisations need to have acquired a cer- .275 .115 .028 .103 .130 .064 .479
tain name, or be known by the public
(2) Organisations need to promote their cause .248 .174 .074 -.065 .118 .077 .434
intensely and make a lot of publicity for it
(6) Organisations need to give fiscal certifi- .139 .055 .186 .058 .153 -.085 .261
cates for tax deductions
(4) Organisations have to commit themselves .081 -.022 .094 .092 .175 .003 .180
to causes which accord with my vision of
life24







Table 4: Deductible donations
C -65308.0 ** -73289.7 ** -55522.4 ** -30118.0 ** -55772.8 **
(11137.2) (11960.7) (10341.1) (4037.91) (9200.64)
PRICE 3394.11 -2814.89 -7454.00 - -
(6256.09) (5142.52) (4992.13)
INC .005 ** - - .004 ** .004 **
(.002) (.001) (.001)
INCPER - 6007.98 - - -
(1557.17)
EGOPRIN 8745.26 ** 8676.93 ** 8995.58 ** - 9001.89 **
(2068.44) (2130.75) (2104.75) (1978.56)
EGOPRES 3037.38 * 1962.09 2663.20 * - 2305.29 *
(1614.98) (1632.30) (1623.16) (1531.13)
ALTREG -829.41 -752.11 -1035.57 - -1023.67
(1382.50) (1417.36) (1402.07) (1268.80)
ALTMUN 195.66 563.11 259.65 - -332.25
(1766.98) (1824.64) (100.52) (1682.88)
NKI 200.39 286.40 436.82 295.10 269.10
(611.36) (616.98) (608.80) (510.27) (565.74)
AGE 157.35 ** 170.69 ** 157.37 ** 101.11 * 123.67 **
(62.87) (64.93) (63.98) (51.96) (60.10)
SCHOOL 2 1026.66 1873.69 2228.66 3471.19 1736.38
(2995.68) (3070.86) (3040.71) (2448.15) (2789.93)
SCHOOL 3 5040.64 * 4667.73 5353.39 * 4338.01 * 4486.98 *
(3096.18) (3100.33) (3155.50) (2642.48) (2070.13)
SCHOOL 4 7939.54 ** 7662.81 ** 8360.37 ** 5378.34 * 7345.86 **
(3305.10) (3468.22) (3456.33) (2846.35) (3186.03)
SCHOOL 5 5677.78 * 6248.81 ** 7206.03 ** 5612.32 ** 5851.70 **
(2886.56) (2909.36) (2009.81) (2409.50) (2685.04)
SCHOOL 6 9448.83 ** 9839.77 ** 11046.2 * 9081.90 ** 10197.7 **
(3117.81) (3155.84) (3144.42) (2570.37) (2881.63)
SCHOOL 7 18379.8 ** 19345.0 ** 21324.3 ** 14220.2 ** 17484.9 **
(3785.65) (3776.42) (3747.83) (3161.40) (3500.00)
IMPREL1 - - - 8392.98 ** 1824.12
(2427.46) (2701.97)
IMPREL2 - - - 3957.37 -1015.76
(2090.75) (2315.32)
IMPREL3 - - - -1435.07 ** -3988.72
(2330.04) (2561.41)
OBS/POS 742/107 729/106 742/107 950/139 704/116
LOG LIK. -1309 -1292 -1313 -1717 -1411
TOBIT, ** : t > 2.0 and * : t > 1.5, (standard errors)26
Table 5: Non-deductible donations
C -2475.6 ** -793.31 ** -1971.7 **
(891.58) (360.62) (915.87)
INC .0002 .0003 ** .0002
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
EGOPRIN 829.03 ** - 756.42 **
(205.85) (206.97)
EGOPRES 148.83 - 100.95
(175.19) (176.99)
ALTREG -95.01 - -118.14
(147.94) (147.35)
ALTMUN -190.44 - -231.36
(192.39) (192.93)
NKI 46.28 5.43 28.46
(63.79) (53.92) (63.81)
AGE 6.55 5.42 4.08
(6.59) (5.55) (6.66)
SCHOOL 2 542.20 * 500.30 ** 526.48 *
(284.95) (242.63) (283.72)
SCHOOL 3 294.01 205.03 256.84
(317.38) (274.21) (315.94)
SCHOOL 4 272.37 273.56 171.84
(367.78) (308.45) (367.48)
SCHOOL 5 690.90 ** 637.50 ** 654.82 **
(296.00) (250.38) (294.81)
SCHOOL 6 1264.63 ** 1024.73 ** 1205.27 **
(330.94) (279.75) (329.83)
SCHOOL 7 1576.77 ** 1287.54 ** 1516.92 **
(452.40) (374.39) (451.73)
IMPREL1 - 927.54 ** 753.72 **
(263.22) (319.64)
IMPREL2 - 358.34 * 111.58
(211.26) (258.81)
IMPREL3 - 104.39 28.82
(222.17) (267.25)
OBS/POS 784/662 950/796 784/662
LOG LIK. -6141 -7343 -6137
TOBIT, ** : t > 2.0 and * : t > 1.5, (standard errors)27
Table 6: Comparison of computed and estimated cost of donations
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